Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Theology Faculty Research and Publications

Theology, Department of

1-1-2013

Contingency and the Giftedness of Creation:
Enacting Grace in a Fractured World
Philip J. Rossi
Marquette University, philip.rossi@marquette.edu

Published version. "Contingency and the Giftedness of Creation: Enacting Grace in a Fractured
World," in To Discern Creation in a Scattering World. Eds. Frederiek Depoortere and Jacques Haers.
Leuven: Peeters Publishing (Uitgeverij Peeters), 2013: 31-42. Permalink. © 2013 Peeters Publishing
(Uitgeverij Peeters). Used with permission.

CONTINGENCY AND THE GIFfEDNESS OF CREATION
ENACTING GRACE IN A FRACTURED WORLD

A mature theological articulation of the contingency of creation
emerged, David Burrell has argued, from a long process of reflection
within the traditions of Abrahamic monotheism. Central to this understanding of the originating of the cosmos - in contrast to Hellenic speculative accounts of necessary emanation from an eterna! principie - is its
characterization of the Creator' s freedom in bringing creation to be:
"creating fills no need in God and sois an utterly spontaneous and gracious act" 1• This account of the contingency of creation thus marks not
only the radical dependence within which the cosmos stands - i.e., it is
not self-originating- but also the gracious free abundance out of which
it is brought to be and sustained. The contingency of creation may thus
be rendered theologically as the sustained primal enactment of gracegood freely bestowed from and enacted by the abundant inner goodness
of God2 •
Y et contingency viewed as the gracious abundance of God' s creating
enactment stands in tension with contingency encountered in the finitude
of creation. This is the contingency of fracture, of "things gone wrong",
of events that could (or should) have been otherwise, but are not - be it
in consequence of the workings of nature or the enmeshment of human
agency in the webs of contingency. A wareness of this tension is not new.
The Book of Job hauntingly exhibits it as dramatic paradigm of the
dynamics of human finitude at the intersection of both dimensions of
contingency. Having voiced well-founded complaints and rebuttals
against the defenses his friends offer on behalf of the workings of contingency in creation that have shattered his world, Job falls silent when
confronted by the radical contingency of creation made manifest to him
by its Author. Job' s confrontation with the contingency of creation thus
provides an initial point of reference for this essay; it then draws
resources from Charles Taylor, George Steiner, and Susan Neiman, as
l. D.B. BURRELL, Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions, Notre Dame, IN, Notre
Dame University Press, 1993, p. 8.
2. See D.B. BURRELL, Creation as Original Grace, in P.J. Rossr (ed.) , God, Grace and
Creation, Maryknoll, NY, Orbis, 2010, p. 99: "Avowing that the origin of the universe is
free means, of course, that it is an utterly gratuitous act of God, a grace " .
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each engages these dynamics of contingency, in order to show how this
interplay of contingencies opens the tensive space within which humans
are called to participate in the worldly enactment of grace.

l. Two

FACES OF CONTINGENCY

l. The Contingency of Creation
All religion, all theology could be defined as an endeavor to grasp, to offer
thanks for, the gratuitous miracle of creation3 •

In their efforts to understand the cosmos in relation to the divine mystery
that the Abrahamic traditions confess as its ground and origin, Jewish,
Christian and Muslim thinkers engaged each another as well as the variegated inheritance of other cosmological speculation, principally, but not
exclusively, Hellenic4 • As Burrell recounts that process, fmding an appropriate way to conceptualize the manner of God's acting free/y in creating
was crucial for forging an understanding of the relation that creation bears
to its Creator in a way that properly respects the radical difference between
them5 . The affmnation of creation ex nihilo provides one important marker
of that difference: it notes that "the most radical sort of beginning" constituted in and by God's creating is "one that is utterly free on the part of
the originator, and so cannot even be said to be received so originating is
it" 6 • Further, the manner in which creation is freely enacted marks the
unique character of this acting as divine acting. lt is radically different from
any form of acting in that world to which divine creating gives origin. The
fundamental activity of divine creating is not an acting done upon what is
pre-existent to the acting. It is not a poesis of "production" bringing forth
from what already is, but rather a radical originating that brings forth "the
to-be of each existing thing", a phrase with which Burrell explicates esse,
the term A quinas uses to "express the effect proper to the frrst and most
universal cause which is God " 7 •
3. G. STEINER, Grammars ofCreation, New Haven, CT, Yale, 2001, p. 128.
4. See BURRELL, Freedom and Creation (n. 1), and Knowing the Unknowable God:
lbn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas, Notre Dame, IN, Notre Dame University Press, 1986.
Burrell recognizes that efforts to understand this relation antedate the medieval interchange
among the traditions Maimonides, Ibn-Sina, and Aquinas represent. He focuses on that
interchange inasmuch as it forges a grammar of creation both more appropriate than any
preceding it and still useful in contemporary contexts.
5. Following R. SOKOLOWSKI, The God of Faith and Reason, Washington, DC, Catholic University, 1995. Burrell calls this " the Christian difference" .
6. BURRELL, Freedom and Creation (n. 1), p. 26.
7. Cf. BURRELL, Knowing the Unknowable God (n. 4), p. 94.
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Burrell takes Aquinas' articulation of the affirmation of God's acting
freely in creation in terms of esse as a major accomplishment that issues
from an extended argument that thinkers in the traditions of Abrahamic
monotheism had with "the necessary emanation scheme of neoplatonism"8. Aquinas' achievement is significant in view of the fact that, in
the intellectual cultures that were matrices for the formative conceptual
articulations of the Abrahamic tradition' s affirmation of God' s free creation, emanation was "the principal contender to a revealed world
view" 9 • Burrell expresses the tradition's core affmnation thus:
Creation means the free origination of all from the one God, who gains
nothing thereby. Moreover, what the notion of free primarily concems is
the lack of any constraint, even a natural constraint; so it need not involve
choice, as it spontaneously does for us, except quite secondarily. That creating fills no need in God and sois an utterly spontaneous and gracious act:
that is the cumulative message of the scriptures appropriated by Maimonides and Aquinas. Everything else, including the apparent description in
Genesis of an initial moment for the created universe, is secondary to that
assertion 10 •

Creation, apprehended as gifted in its unique and singular entirety,
apprehended as Steiner's "gratuitous miracle", displays the enacted graciousness of God to which fitting responses are wonder, thanks and
praise. The contingency of creation presents a face that allows us to
recognize how all that is - including ourselves - radically stands within
a frame of an unasked for dependence 11 • Apprehending that the contingency of creation pertains to it first as a whole, as well asto every space
of its particularity, manifests the thoroughness with which our own
human fmitude isdeeply embedded in that contingency. As doubly part
of the contingency of creation, our finitude may itself be approached as
an object of a reverence evoked by attention to the radical possibility that
we simply might not have been- that we are at al! is unasked for, and
is so in multiple ways. It is not just that creation need not have been; it
is also that neither humanity, nor any of us who instance our species,
need have emerged as an element in that creation.
Yet such reverence also has to contend with the equally unbidden fact
that our finitude means that, as the cosmos goes its course with us as part
of it, the scope of our power and control is small indeed - and the power
8. BURRELL, Freedom and Creation (n. 1), p. 8.
9. /bid.
10. /bid.
11. As 1 am using it, "dependence" is to be understood in terrns of a judgment about
all that is, not simply about one's own status.
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we do have is one we often use neither wisely nor well. Here contingency
presents another, more unsettling, face. We are now aware that "the
starry skies above" - which Kant saw as one of the two referents worthy
to evoke awe from our finite human freedom 12 - stretch billions of light
years beyond the horizon within which he and his age could place them.
We thus might be able to stand under those skies with awe possibly even
greater than his befare the fact that, as human, we can claim no hand in
the bringing forth and sustaining of the cosmos. Yet leaming more about
the complexity of the cosmos from which our species has - on the scale
of cosmic time - only recently emerged does not of itself make us more
attentive of the extent to which far too much of what our species does
seems only to inflict scars upon our meager portian of that cosmos and
upon the fellow beings with whom we share it as a common dwelling
place. In these circumstances, it seems legitimate to question the extent
to which humanity considers itself still capable of responding with equal
awe befare the other referent Kant places befare our freedom: "the moral
law within". Placed against the immensity of cosmos in which our species has conducted itself more as intruder than welcomed guest, might
we be well-advised- contra Kant- to be more modest than he in claiming awe as the proper measure of the worth of our human moral capacities and freedom?
The two-fold source of awe that Kant acknowledges in that well-known
passage in the Critique of Practica! Reason is justly emblematic of the
philosophical anthropology that informs his critica! project, which situates
human fmite freedom in the contingency of the cosmos. Within that anthropology, human reason provides a horizon of hope within which humanity
can envision its moral agency as a power called to play a unique role in
bringing the contingency of creation and contingency in creation to convergence. Though by no means the Enlightenment optimist he has often
been taken to be, Kant did consider human agency, in the long run, able to
meet the moral challenges set befare it by the working of contingency in
the world. That agency has power to make actual the social conditions
befitting the moral freedom of members of a "kingdom of ends"- in particular, an intemational political arder of "perpetua} peace" and a social
arder of human moral interaction (an "ethical commonwealth") within
which virtue can, as it ought, reliably effect happiness.
12. J. KANT, Critique of Practica/ Reason, in Practica/ Philosophy, trans. M.J. Gregor
(The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 269-270. In the standard German edition of Kant (Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Berlin, Koniglich-PreuBiche Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1902-), the
passage is at 5:161-162.
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In the more than two centuries that separate us from Kant, the horrors
all too often wrought by individual and communal human agency have
severely challenged even his carefully tempered confidence in the moral
power of human freedom. As Charles Taylor points out, the expectations
Kant helped to articulate as legitimate moral demands upon human freedom are immense - perhaps too immense for the fragile powers of that
freedom. As a result, the moral horizons of the cultures of later modemity
have been prone to fracture under the pressure of demands for universal
justice and benevolence that seem to exceed our capacities to respond to
them fully. He argues that in the face of such pressure, the two responses
that have often seemed the only options have proven tragically inadequate. The first allows the demands of justice and benevolence an imperiousness that obliterates distinctions between ends and means, and thus
leads to fanaticisms small and large. The second is the temptation to
lower our moral sights, to settle into a sometimes genial, sometimes
jaded, practica} relativism that Taylor aptly likens to "spiritual lobotomy" 13 • In either case, it seems hard to provide a coherent account of how
human freedom exercised within the context of the contingency interna}
to creation deserves to stand in parity with the immense and ages-old
givenness of creation as a source of awe and reverence.

2. Contingency in Creation
The problems of our relative helplessness in the face of contingency arise
whether we are thinking of moral evils or natural ones. For the former are
an instance of the latter: we are one of the things that go wrong with the

world 14•
The contingency of the world' s creation - that in its entirety, and in
each of its parts, it is at al! (for, inasmuch as "creating fills no need in
God", creation simply might never have been)- may evoke wonder and
praise and provide occasions for awe, reverence, and delight, but matters
appear quite differently with contingency encountered within creation.
Contingency encountered in creation - that events and things go amiss
and, far too often, go dreadfully wrong - is occasion for bewilderment,
fear, sadness, despair and rage. Contingency in creation is unsettling not
simply by being random or capricious in how it befalls us; it is unsettling
13. See C. TAYLOR, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern ldentity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 495-521; ID., A Secular Age, Cambridge,
~.Bellcnap , 2007,pp. 495-617.
14. S. NEIMAN, Evil in Modern Thought, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press,
2002, p. 91.
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all the more by the fact that, when things go amiss, we can envision how
they "might have been otherwise" - particularly when the "otherwise"
seems within the scope of human action and control. Unlike the contingency of creation, for which the counter possibility of utterly nothing at
all strains the limits of imagination, thought, and language, we can readily imagine, think and speak of many possibilities of how it might have
been otherwise when things go wrong in the workings of contingency in
creation - and perhaps no more so than when we are enmeshed in contingency in ways that make us participants in its agency 15 •
Long befare the work of Aquinas, Maimonides and lbn-Sina provided
supple conceptual and grammatical strategies to engage questions that
each face of contingency raises, the author of the Book of Job had already
staked out key lines of tension and contrast in their interaction. Each
devastating woe that befalls Job, taken singly, in isolation from each
other, might be accounted as just one more of the many unfortunate
events that take place in the frame of the contingency that functions in
creation through a variety of agencies. Might things have gone otherwise
if the oxen had been plowing in a different field on the other side of his
property, or if his children had been eating and drinking in another house,
or if a more lucrative target for plunder had been available that day for
the Chaldeans or for the Sabeans? But in conjunction with each other- to
which is then added the physical infirmities that beset Job - the manner
in which they all conjointly "go wrong" becomes far more unsettling in
its implications. Though Job and his friends disagree on how to account
for all the ills that befall him, they do agree that these ills cannot simply
be the outcome of a contingency that is totally random with respect to its
moral import. They cannot conceive of the contingency of creation operating so blindly and mindlessly that it defeats all effort to make sense of
its impact upon the human condition.
The arguments that Job' s friends offer are thus not so much defenses
of the intelligibility of intra-worldly contingency as such; they do not
propase to make Job's misfortunes intelligible by offering a dispassionate
account of "how the world works". They provide, instead, a way of
reading the contingency of the human and natural agencies that have
inflicted woe upon Job in relation to the manner in which the divine
judges human worthiness: "how the world works" has to have an order

15. Neiman's striking interpretation of Kant's oft criticized essay On a Supposed Right
to Líe from Altruistic Motives sees it making a point about contingency that "we have no
wish to hear: our power over the consequences of our actions is really very small" (ibid.,
pp. 73-74).
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of intelligibility built into it that also displays the moral necessity of just
reward and punishment. In varied ways, all of Job's friends argue that, if
things have gone wrong for Job, then he must in sorne way bear blame
for it. Blameless suffering is not part of the contingency of the world.
Job's most potent protest against this is that, conscious of his (moral)
blamelessness, if there is any "blame" at all, it líes in the simple fact of
being bom into a world of contingency. J oh' s pro test takes the audacious
tum of shifting the terms of contention between himself and his friends
from a question of blame to a question about the very order of creation,
from a moral question toa metaphysical one. Perhaps more accurately,
Job's protest identifies the fundamental metaphysical question as equally
a moral one 16 •
Neiman points to Levinas for an articulation of this transposition that
not only mutually implicates the metaphysical and the moral, but suggests that their now unbreakable mutual entanglement is rooted in the
historical exercise of human agency in the workings of contingency in
the world:
The first metaphysical question is no longer Leibniz ' s question why is there
something rather than nothing? but why is there evil rather than good? The
ontological difference is preceded by the difference between good and evil.
Difference itself is this latter; it is the origin of the meaningful 17 •

The "no longer" in this Levinasian re-formulation of Leibniz's question is of major import. That our most fundamentallevel of reflection on
the human condition must now - after all the horrific things humans have
done to one another in the twentieth century ( and have continued to do
in the twenty-first) - first consider the " difference between good and
e vil" before grappling with the "ontological difference " is as much a
historical claim as it is a philosophical one. To put this in a way that may
more directly frame its bearing upon the discussion of contingency and
grace, it is a claim that history - the paradigmatic space for the working
of human contingency and thus the intra-worldly tribunal before which
we must be prepared to hold one another accountable for what we do to
shape ( or to shatter) the world we hand on to the future- truly has power
to alter the metaphysical.

16. /bid., pp. 314-328, offers a provocative discussion on linking of the metaphysical
and the moral.
17. E. L EVINAS, Transcendence and Evil, in A. TYMIENICKA (ed.), The Phenomenology
of Man and of the Human Condition, Dordrecht, Riedel, 1983, p. 160, cited by N EIMAN,
Evil (n. 14), pp. 322-323.
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11.

ENACTING ÜRACE WITHIN THE "BETWEEN" OF CONTINGENCIES

"Creation," therefore, offers itself up for definition as that which is enacted
freedom and which includes and expresses in its incarnation the presence
of what is absent from it or of what could be radically other 18 •
The drive to metaphysics is a drive to find a real order behind the apparent
one, in which all the things we long for - the good and the true and the
beautiful- will be connected and revealed 19 •

A provisional way to characterize these two dynamics of contingency
1 have been sketching is to take the first as the "contingency of [creaturely] dependence" and the second as a "contingency of uncertain outcome". Although the latter arises within the context of the former, there
is a crucial difference between them with respect to the way in which that
which comes forth contingently stands in relation to that which brings it
forth. The contingency of creation both manifests the radical non-reciprocity of othemess yet is informed by an equally radical mutuality of
presence. lt is marked by a unique relation in which all that is and whatever is stand in radical dependence with respect to the originative priority of that which is their source 20 • Articulating this relation poses a complex imaginative, conceptual and linguistic challenge. Burrell observes
that "the relation between this One and all that is created cannot be likened to a relation among created things, forcing us to search for a way
of articulating its uniqueness, so leading us ineluctably to 'negative theology,' of which there are several varieties " 21 • We attend to the radicality
of this dependence when we allow ourselves to enter the vertiginous
metaphysical wonder of Leibniz's question "Why is there something
rather than nothing?" We further gesture at the uniqueness of this relation when we grapple with the difficulty of imagining there being "nothing at all", as well as when we ponder the aporiai that since Parmenides

18. STEINER, Grammars of Creation (n. 3), p. 131.
19. NEIMAN, Evil (n. 14), p. 203.
20. See BURRELL, Creation as Original Grace (n. 2), p. 104: "If creator and creature
were distinct from each other in an ordinary way, the relation- even one of dependence
- could not be non-reciproca!; for ordinarily the fact that something depends from an
originating agent, as a child from a parent, must mark a difference in that agent itself. Yet
the fact that a cause of being, properly speaking, is not affected by causing all-that-is does
not imply remoteness or uncaring; indeed, quite the opposite. For such a One must cause
in such a way as to be present in each creature as that to which it is oriented in its very
existing. In that sense, this One cannot be considered as other than what it creates, in an
ordinary sense of that term; justas the creature's esse-ad assures that it cannot be separately from its source".
21. D.B. BURRELL, Creator/Creatures Relation: 'The Distinction' vs. 'Ontotheology',
in Faith and Philosophy 25 (2009) 177-189, p. 182.
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have constantly beset efforts to articulate a syntax for speaking of what,
in contrast to all that is or might be, (absolutely) "is not" 22 •
In contrast, the contingency of uncertain outcome provides abundant
possibilities for imagining what may or may not be. In this regard, it
serves as a fundamentallocus within which we engage practices that both
govem and test various grammars of cause and effect. Inasmuch as the
non-reciproca} manner of dependence central to the contingency of creation (as a whole) is of a singular kind, mapping it onto the (reciproca!)
language of "causality" poses enormous imaginative and conceptual difficulties. The dependence central to the contingency of what God creates
is notan instance (let alone a "super-instance") ofthe dependence within
creation that we construe as cause and effect, even though we seem to
have no more evident or perspicuous way of expressing creation' s contingency of radical dependence other than terms drawn from intra-worldly
forms of causal efficacy. E ven Aquinas' hard won articulation of this
unique relation into the language of the Creator's esse (and, as Burrell
astutely notes, of creation's esse-ad) can all too easily be read to mark a
trajectory drawing of God into the ambit of the "ontotheological" 23 •
A further complication in the relation between these two dynamics of
contingency arises on the side of the contingency of uncertain outcome.
Uncertainty here is not simply the epistemic qualification that we are not
in a position to know all the factors that converge to bring about this
result. Chagrín, grief, regret from thinking that "it could have been otherwise" do not arise simply from a belief that, if I had left three minutes
later the collision at the intersection would not have happened; it arises
as much from a sense of not having had control of the outcome as it does
from a sense of a lack of knowledge. It is not that the working of the
22. Perplexities confronting grammar and imagination in limning the contours of the
"not" delimiting the radical contingency of creation have preoccupied a number of philosophical and theological inquiries in late modemity. These offer opportunities for philosophical engagement with theological questions that, earlier in modemity, would be dismissed as, at best, the quaint residue of metaphysical perspectives of little credibility in
an intellectual culture of empirical science and secularity.
23. See BURRELL, Creator/Creatures Relation (n. 21), pp. 177-189. In Creation as
Original Grace (n. 2), p. 104, Burrell notes: "So the very existence (esse) of a creature is
an esse-ad, an existing which is itself a relation to its source. Yet since the Other is the
cause of being, each thing which exists-to the creator also exists in itself: derived existence
is no less substantial when it is derived from the One-who-is, so it would appear that one
could succeed in talking of existing things without explicitly referring them to their source.
'The distinction', in other words, need not appear. But that sirnply reminds us how unique
a non-reciproca! relation of dependence must be: it characterizes one relation only: that
of creatures to creator ... ". For a related defense of Aquinas against the charge of being
progenitor of the "ontotheological", see M.J. BUCKLEY, Denying and Disclosing God:
The Ambiguous Progress of Modern Atheism, New Haven, CT, Y ale, 2004, pp. 48-69.
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world is opaque; it is that the world does not do our bidding. Recognition
of this, of course, is one important lesson in the life-long currículum of
studies we all need in order to put firmly in place the recognition that we
are not God. Yet the issue runs even deeper: even if we are able to come
to terms with the fact that a world thoroughly enmeshed in the contingency of uncertain outcome does not do our bidding, discerning (let
alone comprehending) what might then constitute God's bidding in such
a world seems an achievement beyond human capacities.
So even though we do not stand in Job's dire circumstances, this does
not give us license to think that we are better placed than he to comprehend whether and how the world does God's bidding. Job's friends certainly thought they had such license; so they do not hesitate to propose
accounts in which reward and punishment provide the central dynamic
for discerning how the world does God's bidding. What differentiates Job
from his friends is thus not his unwavering confidence that, even though
all that has befallen him puts the very form of good and justice in question, the world nonetheless does God's bidding. The difference between
them líes instead in Job's acknowledgment that he can no longer comprehend how it does so, given that his plight so patently stands counter
to any standard of earthly or heavenly justice. It no longer makes sense
for J oh to take the contours of God' s will and work within the world' s
contingency of uncertain outcome to be bounded by questions of reward
and punishment. Susan Neiman perceptively suggests that the truth that
Job sees may be that "there is no moral order in the world as it is, and
there ought to be some" 24 •
A further difference between Job and his friends líes in his readiness,
based on his confidence that the cosmos does God' s bidding, to call on
God to render on his own behalf an account that would make comprehensible to Job a creation so riddled with contingencies that impinge
disastrously upon the trajectories of human life. In offering this challenge
to God, Job is probing, more deeply than his friends have wisdom or
courage to do, the space upon which the contingency of the radical
dependence of creation- from which issues the unasked-for character of
Joh ' s own existence as well as the sheer abundance of a cosmos teeming
with energy and life- intersects most painfully and poignantly with the
contingency of fracture and uncertain outcome, of things gone wrong
within creation. Job holds steadfastly to the possibility of living with
integrity within the contingency of fracture - yet his calling God to
24. S. NEIMAN, Moral Clarity: A Guide f or Grown-up Idealists, Orlando, FL, Harcourt,
2008, p. 421.
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account does not result in rendering the contingency of fracture more
comprehensible. It evokes instead a display of the divine gratuity by
which creation was brought to be. God's response to Job's challenge,
though it initially seems only an assertion of raw power over the workings of the contingency of fracture, points more tellingly to the gratuity
of the radical contingency of creation:
The speech reveals the Creator's pride, to be sure, but with language that
justifies it. Life is itself a gift, when this is what it looks like, and each of
us is in debt to the world for the gift of having lived in it ... If God speaks
truth, as Job admits, it may be to say that creating moral order in the world
is just what we're meant to give back to it. If there's going to be reason in
the world, it is we who have to put it there 25 •

What Neiman terms "Job's final humility" 26 seems to come from a
recognition that the grace of living with hope in a creation that is morally
fractured by contingency requires that we first attend to the radical gratuity of the coming to be that is the primal grace of creation.
As significant as Job's venturing into this space "between" the two
dynamics of contingency may be, of even greater significance is the fact
that God comes forward to encounter him upon that space. The voice
from the whirlwind resounds with divine power, but does not grind Job
into deeper misery; in the context of Job' s challenge, it gestures to a
divine vulnerability meeting him on the fractured ground of contingency.
It marks what Charles Taylor calls the "first mystery": "God's initiative
is to enter, in full vulnerability, the heart of the [human] resistance [to
God], to be among humans, offering participation in the divine life" 27 .
On a Christian reading of the Book of Job, there is good reason for taking
God's initiative in standing with Job in the space of contingency as
a foreshadowing of the enactment of grace that is brought to fullness in
the incamation and the suffering love of Jesus: "God's steadfast resolve
not to abandon humanity in its worst distress" 28 •
Neiman puts well the criticism that has long stalked the prose narrative
that concludes the text with the restoration of Job's fortunes: "The ending ... seems to ignore all of the questions the rest of the book posed" 29 .
Yet more pertinent to questions of contingency and grace may be the fact
that God invites Job to make efficacious intercession for bis friends,
whose well intentioned words brought neither wisdom nor comfort
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

!bid.
!bid., pp. 421-422.
TAYLOR, A Secular Age (n. 13), p. 654.
!bid.
NEIMAN, Moral Clarity (n. 24), pp. 415-416.
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because they misspoke God. Yet for all that, Job' s friends nonetheless
did enact what may be the frrst grace for the space of fractured contingency: they did not abandon him. J oh' s intercession completes that
grace: it signals that, for all their pride and bluster, God does not leave
them abandoned in the space of contingency. At the end, they have all
become instruments of God's enacting - through Job in integrity and
wisdom, through his friends unwittingly - the primal form of grace by
which the di vine enters the fractured landscape of human contingency:
accompaniment of one another in and through our brokenness.
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